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Understanding How Foreign Influence and Strongman
Policies Prevent Democracy in Egypt
Devin Smith
Devin Smith is a Diplomacy and International Relations major at Seton Hall University with a Middle
Eastern Studies minor planning to graduate in May >?>@. The objective of his thesis was to investigate
the factors that prevent the spread of democracy in Egypt. Upon graduation, Devin hopes to find a job in
the nonprofit sector.

W

ith the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the fall of authoritarian regimes
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia
in the early 1990s, it appeared that global
democracy was on the rise in what scholars
have called “Democracy’s Third Wave”.
Countries previously thought extremely
unlikely to become susceptible to democratic
movements, such as Poland in 1989, had
finally overthrown the shackles of autocratic
communism and transitioned towards
democratic rule. However, as more countries
than ever before began the tumultuous journey
towards democracy, the Arab world largely
remained stagnant behind the curtain of
authoritarianism.
Egypt in particular remained strongly
behind the fulcrum of autocracy even as it
seemed that the world was largely leaving
autocratic leaders such as Egypt’s Hosni
Mubarak behind. “During the 1980s and
1990s, as dictatorships in Latin America,
Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia collapsed,
Egypt’s autocracy stood firm. Although
opposition movements across the developing
world vaulted into power through dramatic
election victories, President Mubarak thwarted
kindred campaigns against his rule. (Mubarak)
seemed to exercise almost unparalleled
domination and to have an extraordinary
ability to preserve (his) own incumbency

while preparing the way for their chosen
successors”1.
While Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s longestserving self-styled ‘president’, seemed
entrenched against any sort of opposition that
sought to even remotely stymie his widereaching power, the 2011 Arab Spring protests
proved that even modern Egypt’s longest
serving president was not immune to a mass
popular uprising.
In the case of Egypt’s centralized executive
arena, unanticipated but relentless popular
protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square as well as
other major squares across every major city
overwhelmed the Interior Ministry’s
security apparatus. By physically defeating
the security forces in pitched street battles
over four days, protesters effectively shut
down the country. This caused the military
to intervene and deploy personnel and
armored vehicles into the streets on January
28. During the tense days after the military
deployed and before Mubarak stepped
down on February 11, the NDP faded from
existence. The party’s paralyzed state was
complemented by the disappearance of the
police and security forces. As the standoff
continued, Egyptians and the world
watched anxiously whether the military
would open fire on the protesters. The
military, which has extensive economic
interests and has served as a regime’s core
since 1952, reiterated the promise that it

1

Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of
Democratization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 122.
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would not. Time eventually ran out for
Mubarak and his executive elites as the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) nudged them out the door.2
The removal of Hosni Mubarak from power
served as a powerful, inspirational message to
the Egyptian people that real change, however
unlikely it may have seemed, was possible.
The first round of presidential elections
occurred on May 23–24, 2012.
Muhammad Morsi, a senior Muslim
Brotherhood leader and president of the
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party
(FJP), came in first with 24.8 percent of
the vote. Ahmad Shafiq, a former military
officer and Mubarak protégé who briefly
served as prime minister in early 2011,
won 23.7 percent… (Morsi) campaigned
as the “candidate of the revolution” who
would fight against the counterrevolutionary forces in the military, the
judiciary, and the security services.
Morsi’s efforts were successful. He won
52 percent of the vote to Shafiq’s 48
percent. The military accepted Shafiq’s
defeat and allowed Morsi to assume office.
For the first time in Egypt’s 5,000-year
history, the country had an elected national
leader. In his inaugural address, Morsi
promised to be the president of all
Egyptians and to build a new Egypt that is
“civil, national, constitutional, and
modern.3
Unfortunately, Egypt’s experiment with
democracy did not prove to be a lasting one.
On July 3, 2013 the Egyptian Armed Forces
removed Morsi from power barely a year after
had been sworn in. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a
former general in the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces of Egypt and former Director of

Military Intelligence, assumed the presidency
with a dubious 96% of the vote in 2014.4 He
has remained in power ever since.
Egypt, with the exception of the brief
presidency of Mohamed Morsi, has remained
mostly thoroughly autocratic since Gamal
Nasser’s ascension to the presidency in 1954.
But why is that the case? In this thesis, I will
argue that a combination of foreign influence
from Western and other Arab states, religious
extremism and sectarianism, and entrenched
political interests within Egypt all play a hand
in undermining democracy in Egypt. It is my
opinion that lasting, free democracy in Egypt,
however unlikely, will always be possible if
these hurdles can somehow be overcame.
Egypt, with a population of 95 million
people, has the largest population in the
Middle East and plays an important role as a
regional power and key US ally in a
constantly volatile region of the world. While
it may seem counterintuitive for the United
States, which is often seen as a key
liberalizing global force, to continuously ally
itself with and support an autocratic state such
as Egypt, it is largely within the United States’
interest to support and reinforce the status
quo. “Rather than fostering democracy in an
incremental fashion, U.S. and Egyptian
officials have promoted an autocratic security
state that supports a U.S.-led regional order
built around Israeli security and the projection
of U.S. influence over the Persian Gulf. By
contrast, public opinion in Egypt favors a
regional security order less dominated by the
United States and Israel, and a government
that respects political competition and civil
liberties”5. However, as the successive
military regimes in Egypt show, it is not
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Joshua Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats : Regime Power
in Egypt and Syria (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2012), 158.
3
Bruce Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism,
Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World (New York,
NY: Princeton University Press, 2008), XII-XIII.

“Egypt election: Sisi secures landslide win,” BBC
News, 29 May 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-27614776.
5
Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention : The Politics
of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3.
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Egyptian public opinion that drives the
government to action.
Further working against the will of the
Egyptian people is how strongly the United
States supports autocratic regimes in Egypt
when deemed to be beneficial for Washington.
“The problem for Washington was not that
pro-U.S. authoritarianism would be followed
by more authoritarianism, but that the
successor government, democratic or not,
could turn Egyptian policies away from U.S.
preferences. Hence, U.S. officials worked to
check Islamic political activity, either by
cultivating a liberal option between the NDP
(Mubarak’s National Democratic Party) and
the Muslim Brotherhood or by squarely
backing Mubarak”6.
EARLY AMERICAN- EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

In order to best understand the relationship
between Cairo and Washington, and later
Cairo and other Gulf States, it is important to
consider the history of relations between the
two, dating back to Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat’s split with Moscow. While there were
relations between Cairo and Washington
dating back to the 1952 coup d’état, Cairo had
severed relations with Washington completely
following the devastation that Egypt faced in
1967’s Six Day War against Israel7. Israel, the
United States’ key Middle Eastern partner,
preemptively struck Egyptian airfields,
effectively crippling the Egyptian air force
and paving the way for the relatively easy
Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and
Gaza Strip, as well as the West Bank from
Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria.
Following the severance of U.S.-Egyptian
relations, Egypt was a firmly under the
influence of the Soviet Union. Faced with the
embarrassment of Israel’s occupation of the
Sinai Peninsula, Egypt had closely aligned
6

Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 10.
Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 15.
8
Saadeddin Ibrahim, “A Socio-cultural Paradigm of
Pan Arab Leadership: the Case of Nasser,” in
7

itself with Soviet influence; further, Gamal
Nasser’s Arab socialist and anti-imperialist
policy paid off as it earned Egypt critical
economic and military support from the Soviet
Union. Nasser’s regime remained vehemently
opposed to the pro-western Baghdad Pact,
further demonstrating the general disdain for
the United States that Nasser’s regime had
felt8.
DÉTENTE WITH THE UNITED STATES

Following Gamal Nasser’s death in 1970,
however, his successor Anwar Sadat began
reorienting Egyptian foreign policy towards a
more pro-western approach. Facing a stagnant
economy and the continued occupation of the
Sinai Peninsula, Sadat grew tired of the status
quo and began making overtures to the west.
“In mid-1973, he seemed to most
Egyptians and Arabs a pathetic leader,
worthy of sympathy rather than anger. But
the October (1973 Yom Kippur) War later
that year transformed his image to that of
an instant national hero… What mattered
was that Sadat had led the Arabs (with
Assad of Syria) into a fighting battle with
an opportunity to defy the enemy and
vindicate Arab dignity. The October War
for Sadat could have been what the 1956
Suez War was for Nasser, baptizing him as
a pan-Arab leader. However, in the
following months it gradually emerged
that the man fought not so much in
defiance of the West or against what is
perceived to be the West’s local surrogate
(Israel), but rather to be accepted in the
West. He was even suspected of being
eager to serve, along with Israel and the
Shah of Iran, as another American
surrogate in the area”9.
While it may be disingenuous to refer to
Sadat as an American surrogate, his relations
Leadership and Development in Arab Society, ed. Faud
Khuri (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut,
1981), 49.
9
Ibrahim, “The Case of Nasser,” 56.
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with the United States was certainly
unprecedented in Egyptian history. The 1973
Yom Kippur War, while ultimately an Israeli
victory, saw Egyptian troops on the offensive
for the first time since before Egypt’s
humiliating defeat in the 1967 Six Day War in
an initially successful surprise attack against
Israeli forces. Following the war, a newly
reinvigorated Sadat had reestablished relations
with Washington, eventually shirking Moscow
altogether. “While Anwar Sadat sought
territory and foreign investment, the White
House wanted a strategic advantage over the
Soviet Union. The mutual benefits of a U.S.Egyptian alliance only became clear to both
sides, though, after Sadat took Egypt to
war”10.
Sadat’s shift from a Soviet client state to a
vital American partner in the region was
relatively quick, happening within the span of
only several years. Though a friendship treaty
had been signed between Cairo and Moscow
in 1971, Soviet military advisors were
expelled from Egypt the following year, and
the friendship treaty itself was abrogated in
1976, only two years after relations with
Washington were reestablished. “In March
1976, in a fresh bid for U.S. military
assistance, Sadat told Parliament to cancel
Egypt’s friendship treaty with the USSR. In
April, he denied Soviet ships access to
Egyptian ports (although the Soviet Union
remained, for the time being, Egypt’s largest
trading partner). After Sadat snubbed Egypt’s
former patrons in Moscow, Washington began
selling C-130 military transport aircraft to
Egypt. Six C-130s were delivered in 1976, but
only after Kissinger promised Congress that
the sales would not constitute a precedent and
that there would be no further Egyptian
requests for materiel that calendar year. For
the next fiscal year, bilateral economic aid and
food subsidies to Egypt would top $1
billion”11.

SADAT’S INCREASINGLY AUTHORITARIAN
TENDENCIES

10

11

Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 15.

While Sadat’s regime was becoming
increasingly cozy with Washington, Sadat
began the dual tasks of tightening his grip on
Egyptian society and securing increasing
amounts of American weapons and military
equipment. Somewhat ironically, Cairo’s
increasing detente with Washington occurred
simultaneously with Sadat rolling back
freedoms for the Egyptian people.
Washington, solely interested in a strong
military partner in the region to counter Soviet
influence and eliminating a military threat to
Israel, generally reacted to Sadat’s growing
strongman tendencies with apathy.
In an attempt to balance Egypt’s budget
deficit, Sadat cut government subsidies on
cooking gas, rice, and sugar in 1976,
increasing the average Egyptian’s cost of
living by 15%. These subsidy cuts resulted in
the greatest social unrest seen in Egypt in
decades, with 30,000 protestors facing off
with police in Cairo.
“An estimated eighty people were killed,
hundreds were wounded, and 1,200 to
2,000 were arrested. The price revolt
traumatized Sadat, some say permanently.
He ‘was 100 percent changed by the
experience’ and ‘became aggressive,’
recalled then minister of defense Abd alGhani Gamassy, who had led the military’s
intervention. Sadat, who fancied himself to
be liberalizing Egypt, warned that
democracy had ‘fangs one hundred times
sharper than the extraordinary measures’ of
dictatorship. During a two-hour television
broadcast on February 3, he pinned the riots
on Soviet agents and communist remnants
from Nasser’s administration. Egypt’s
enemies had exploited the November 1976
elections to sow doubt and propaganda. In
order to preserve national unity and prevent
another “uprising of thieves,” Sadat would
rollback his earlier reforms, criminalize
Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 24.
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strikes and demonstrations (on penalty of
life imprisonment with hard labor), and
confine electoral competition to
government-sanctioned parties. ‘We hereby
end one period,’ Sadat proclaimed, ‘and we
begin a new one.’ A February 10 plebiscite
approved the measures with a suspicious
99.4 percent12”.

Further compounding the situation of the
Egyptian public’s rights were Sadat’s attempts
at a lasting, permanent peace with Israel. This
put Sadat in a tough position as Israel was
deeply unpopular with not only the Egyptian
public, but also the Arab world writ large.
Jordanian and Syrian territory was still under
Israeli occupation as well as the Sinai
Peninsula, inviting even more malice directed
at Israel from nearby Arab states. Despite the
fierce opposition to peace with Israel, Sadat
pressed on. Egyptian newspapers critical of
Israel were shuttered, opposition parties
suspended operations, and dissident members
of parliament were expelled in a plebiscite
with 98.29% of voters approving13. While
Jimmy Carter’s human rights-focused
administration “regretted” Sadat’s deliberalizing policies, Carter nonetheless
pushed forward in promoting Israeli-Egyptian
peace talks. Sadat was at a particular
disadvantage, with the only concession Israel
agreeing to being a full Israeli withdrawal
from the Sinai Peninsula. The West Bank and
Golan heights would remain under Israeli
occupation, Israeli settlement activity would
resume, and Israel would not agree to any
form of Palestinian self-rule. However, with
Sadat’s primary goal being an Israeli
withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and his
secondary goal being to secure American
military aid, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty
was still signed in the White House in 1979.

“On March 17 and 19 (1978), (American
Secretary of State) Brown concluded the
details of U.S. military assistance, the
linchpin of peace… Egypt would get
$1.5billion “in loans to finance
procurement through fiscal year 1982 of
defense articles and defense services,” as
well as $300,000 in economic assistance.
The arrangement created an informal norm
that aid to Israel and Egypt would follow a
3:2 ratio. On March 26 in Washington,
Sadat and (Israeli Prime Minister) Begin
signed the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty,
along with texts covering West Bank
autonomy talks, normalization of
Egyptian-Israeli relations, and Egyptian oil
sales to Israel. The treaty also capped
Sadat’s long quest for U.S. weaponry.
That summer, the United States sold Egypt
“several hundred air-to-air and air-tosurface missiles,” 550 armored personnel
carriers, “twelve batteries of Improved
Hawk air-defense missiles,” and 35F-4E
Phantom fighter-bombers14”.
In the same year that the Egypt-Israel Peace
Treaty was signed, Iran, at the time one of the
United States’ primary partners in the region,
underwent their 1979 Islamic Revolution,
ousting the Shah and severing diplomatic ties
with the United States. With one of the
primary pillars of American foreign policy on
the Middle East destroyed, the United States
became increasingly reliant on Egypt as one of
its primary partners; Egypt was more than
willing to fulfill this role in exchange for
military and economic aid. While Egypt
became increasingly integrated into American
foreign policy in the region, Sadat continued
to become more despotic. While the economy
was in shambles with inflation hovering
around an astounding 30 percent, Sadat
changed the Egyptian constitution through
rigged plebiscite to establish Islamic law as
the primary source of legislation, remove the

12

14

PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND WARMER
RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON

13

Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 25.
Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 30.

Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 37.
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presidential term limits that would have
removed him from power, and criminalize
transgressive speech15. “Although Carter
prided himself on being a human rights
advocate, he refrained from criticizing Sadat
about his plebiscites, censorship, and police
repression. In fact, he depended on Sadat’s
autocratic prerogatives to conclude the
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty16”.
SADAT’S ASSASSINATION AND MUBARAK’S
RISE TO POWER

While Israel slowly withdrew from the
Sinai Peninsula over the three-year period
stipulated in the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty,
Sadat increasingly turned Egypt into a
surveillance state. Concerned about critics of
the treaty sabotaging peace efforts, Sadat
significantly increased audio and video
surveillance while also tripling the amount of
riot police to 300,000. “In September 1981,
the Ministry of the Interior arrested or
detained more than 1,500 party activists and
leading cultural figures, including the Coptic
pope and the General Guide of the Muslim
Brotherhood. The dragnet swept up
secularists, leftists, liberals, and Islamists. One
victim was a young man in southern Egypt
named Mohamed Islambouli. On October 6,
Mohamed’s brother Khaled and three fellow
Islamic militants assassinated Sadat during a
military parade commemorating the war in
1973. Vice President Hosni Mubarak survived
the shooting and assumed the presidency”17.
With the assassination of Anwar Sadat,
Hosni Mubarak went on to become the
longest-serving and perhaps most autocratic
president in Egypt’s history. In office from
Sadat’s assassination in 1981 leading up to the
2011 Arab Spring protests that removed him
from power, Mubarak ruled for nearly thirty
years by continuing and expanding Sadat’s
oppressive policies and by further cozying up
to the United States.
15
16

Brownlee, Democracy Prevention,.40.
Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 42.

ANTIDEMOCRATIC COUP IN ALGERIA

In 1991 Algeria, another despotic state in
North Africa, underwent multiparty
democratic elections for the first time after
decades of military rule; candidates from a
conservative Islamic party, the Fronte
Islamique du Salat won more than 80% of the
open seats in Algeria’s parliament. In a move
that sent a chilling message to Egyptian
democracy advocates the Algerian military
froze elections, effectively ensuring that they
held onto power. The United States, doubtless
concerned about the geopolitical implications
of an Islamist party taking power, stood by the
Algerian military’s antidemocratic coup. As
then US Secretary of State Jim Baker put it,
“Generally speaking, when you support
democracy, you take what democracy gives
you... If it gives you a radical Islamic
fundamentalist, you’re supposed to live with
it. We didn’t live with it in Algeria because
we felt that the radical fundamentalists’ views
were so adverse to what we believe in and
what we support, and to what we under-stood
the national interests of the United States to
be”18.
To observers in Algeria and Egypt alike,
the United States’ continued support for the
Algerian military over the democratically
elected FIS sent the unfortunate message that
the United States would continue to support
entrenched autocrats in order to secure their
own interests, leaving fledgling democratic
movements to falter if their interests don’t
coincide with those of the United States.
EGYPT AND THE WAR ON TERROR

However, Mubarak never allowed
elections as free as those in Algeria that nearly
brought the FIS to power during his reign.
Egypt’s 1990 elections were boycotted by
opposition parties due to blatantly unfair
election rules and a lack of independent
17
18

Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 41.
Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 59.
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supervision, leading to an extension of
Mubarak’s grip on power. Further providing
Mubarak’s regime with a casus belli against
opposition to the regime, a group of Egyptian
radicals with military experience from fighting
against the Soviets in Afghanistan called the
Islamic Group attempted to assassinate
Interior Minister Zaki Badr. This assassination
attempt, followed by another that mistakenly
killed Speaker of the Parliament Rifaat
Mahjub instead, brought Islamist movements
firmly into the crosshairs of the Egyptian
security apparatus, triggering increasingly
bloody crackdowns. Badr defended this
newfound brutality by claiming “I only want
to kill one percent of the population”19.
Further accentuating the dire situation of
Islamists in Egypt was the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing in New York City, carried out
by a Kuwaiti national mentored by Omar
Abdel Rahman, a radical Egyptian-born cleric
living in New York. Abdel Rahman was
sentenced to life in prison for his role in the
bombing, leaving American officials with the
impression that supporting Mubarak’s fight
with Egyptian Islamists could end up leaving
America safer. Following the bombing, the
Clinton administration gave Mubarak’s
security apparatus a key role in the United
States’ War on Terror against Islamic
extremists20. An uptick in terror attacks
carried out by Islamists, such as the United
States Embassy bombings in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998, led to increasingly
draconian measures carried out by both the
United States and Egypt.
In 1999, Mubarak addressed Egypt’s
trajectory while receiving an honorary degree
from Georgetown University: “The road to
democracy is a long one, and we travel it with
confidence. We have not turned back under
the most difficult conditions, economic
hardships, social pressures, malicious

terrorism and narrow-minded intolerance. And
we will not turn back, nor will our belief in the
rule of law be shaken. We will work towards
consolidating our democracy gradually,
steadily, and in the spirit of tolerance and
cooperation that is known about the Egyptian
people”. That year, Mubarak was elected to a
fourth term, and had ruled longer than Nasser
had21. Mubarak had also exceeded Sadat in the
number of arrests (25,000 to 19,000),
casualties from political violence (2,386 to
250), and accounted for 41% of all Egyptians
killed or wounded in political violence since
the 1952 Coup d’état. He was reelected
president in 1999 by 93.79 percent of the
vote22.

19

22

20

23

Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 59-60.
Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 60.
21
Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 67-68.

FREEDOM AGENDA AND MULTICANDIDATE
ELECTIONS

With the election of George W. Bush to
President of the United States in 2000, his
trademark Freedom Agenda resulted in a
continued status quo for democracy and
opposition activists in Egypt. “Even as Bush
called on Mubarak to lead the Middle East
toward democracy, the United States
depended on the Egyptian president to
interrogate al-Qaeda suspects, ease U.S. craft
through Egyptian waters and airspace, and
keep tabs on Gaza after Israel withdrew.
Political reform was pushed only so far as it
helped ensure the post-Mubarak regime would
be pro-American. Hence, the Freedom Agenda
was not a turning point for U.S. foreign
policy, but a variant of the existing
approach”23.
Bush even went as far as to say in 2002
that “There are some in the world who don’t
like President Mubarak because of what he
stands for, a more open society. He’s been a
great leader of Egypt, and there are extremists
who don’t like him. And to the extent that we
can help round up those extremists that would
Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 61.
Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 70.
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do harm to the President or his government or
the people of Egypt, we will do so”24.
The military alliance between Cairo and
Washington proved to be useful to both
nations during the 2003 Iraq War, where
Egypt was more than happy to provide free
access to the Suez Canal for American
military personnel en route to the Persian
Gulf. Following Saddam Hussein’s overthrow
and the discovery that Iraq was not in fact
harboring weapons of mass destruction, Bush
framed the invasion as part of his Freedom
Agenda; a free, democratic Iraq would make
the Middle East more free. But while the Bush
Administration was promoting democracy in
Iraq, it was doing the opposite in Egypt.
Mubarak was now in his seventies, and
without a vice president or a clear successor.
With the American-led Iraq War, and by
extension American foreign policy in the
Middle East shown to be extremely unpopular
with the Egyptian public in opinion polls, a
shift towards democracy or Mubarak’s death
or overthrow could very easily lead to a new
Egyptian government overtly hostile to
American interests. Indeed, 98 percent of
Egyptians polled held an unfavorable view of
the United States. Despite the optics and
rhetoric, Bush’s Freedom Agenda would in no
way challenge the status quo in Egypt, and the
two countries would continue to work together
militarily25.
Following the Iraq War, Egyptian police,
diplomats, and soldiers continued to receive
training from the United States in the name of
counterterrorism, with millions of dollars from
the US State Department’s Antiterrorism
Assistance Program being sent to Egyptian
security forces. These same ‘counterterror’
trainees were found in the State Department’s
2004 human rights report to be responsible for
“torture, extralegal detention, mass arrest, and
unlawful killing”26. Had the United States
been truly bothered by this flagrant abuse of

resources that may leave American aid
culpable for Mubarak’s strong-arm tactics, the
aid and training could have been cut or
withdrawn. It never was.
Up until 2005, Egyptian elections saw the
Egyptian public voting either yes or no on a
single candidate nominated by the Egyptian
parliament, with the candidate always being
either Mubarak or his predecessors. Worried
that parliament could be swayed to nominate
either his increasingly popular son or another
charismatic leader, Mubarak asked parliament
to amend the constitution to allow
multicandidate presidential elections. Though
lauded by American officials such as
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the
election process itself remained as corrupt as
ever. Opposition leaders were forbidden from
campaigning, election observation teams were
prevented from monitoring election sites,
members of Mubarak’s NDP Party blatantly
intervened, and government-backed thugs and
security forces blocked opposition supporters
from voting. Ayman Nour, leader of the
opposition el-Ghad Party and the leading
opposition candidate, was arrested on
fabricated charges. Mubarak won by a margin
of 88.6% of the vote, only 5% less than the
last plebiscite. A US embassy cable cautioned
that while the elections “undermined
Mubarak’s credibility as a leader of
democratic reforms and… strained our ties
with Egypt… The bedrock of our strategic
interests with Egypt remains as important as
ever”27.

24

26

25

Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 73.
Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 85-86.

ENTRENCHED, GRIDLOCKED POWER

Egypt’s failure to democratize along with
its continual trudge on an authoritarian path
despite growing democratic movements in
other countries once seemingly inhospitable to
democracy such as Poland, Mali, Ghana, and
Argentina is due to issues largely local to
Egypt rather than any overarching cultural or

27

Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 86.
Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 92-96.
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demographic reasons. Mubarak’s National
Democratic Party, and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s
military junta following his election in 2014,
completely refuse to allow any sort of
opposition movement to freely and fully
participate in politics28, leaving whichever
strongman is in power with complete authority
to run the country as he wishes. Egypt’s
formidable security forces, backed by
American training, weapons, and funding,
have been effectively used to protect the
interests of Mubarak, and eventually el-Sisi, to
destroy organized opposition and ensure the
regime’s power remains unchecked.
Mubarak, el-Sisi, and their forebearers
prevented opposition advocates, be it liberal,
Islamic, or anything else, from converting
their popular bases among the Egyptian
people into political gains. Mubarak’s nowshuttered National Democratic Party
effectively provided the only source of
political advancement available to any
Egyptian for decades, allowing the party to
survive any sort of dissent from either the
Egyptian public or the very few dissident
party members29. The National Democratic
Party, or the Egyptian military following elSisi’s rise to power in 2014, also provided a
mechanism for mediation between Egypt’s
political elites, preventing defections from the
party and eliminating any outside political
movements as opportunities for elites to
oppose the government.30
Egypt’s continued alliance with the
United States despite the massive
humanitarian shortcomings of authoritarian
regimes since Anwar Sadat demonstrates a
failure on America’s part to effectively
promote democracy. While American officials

have not always remained quiet on their desire
for Egypt and other Arab states to
democratize, especially under Bush’s Freedom
Agenda, Egyptian responses have remained
cosmetic without making the country any
more free31. Mubarak’s decision to implement
multicandidate elections in 2005, for instance,
was greeted with commendation by American
officials but ultimately failed to bring about
any lasting change to Egyptian politics. Even
after opposition leader Ayman Nour was
arrested and tortured following these
supposedly multicandidate elections,
Washington’s only response was to release a
press statement calling for Nour’s release
based on ‘humanitarian concern’32. A visit by
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Egypt
the following year saw no mention of Nour,
who remained a prisoner until 2009 and
eventually had to flee the country.
Egypt’s development of a neopatriarchal
society, defined by Hisham Sharabi as a
process where a state blends patrimonial
culture into its institutions33, further limits
Egypt’s ability to democratize. Dependency
on the state for economic wellbeing,
underdevelopment of social and economic
factors, the ruling regime’s authoritarian
relationship with the Egyptian public, the
fragmentation of organized opposition and
successive defeats of both organized
opposition and protest movements leave the
Egyptian people apathetic, depoliticized, and
demoralized34. In effect, the regime has made
itself inevitable.

28

32

Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization,
151.
29
Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization,
156.
30
31

Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 29.
Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 29-30.

INTERFERENCE FROM OTHER ARAB STATES

Egypt is far from the only autocracy in the
region, with other conservative monarchies,
Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement on
Conviction of Egyptian Politician Ayman Nour,” The
White House, December 2005, https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/200512
24-1.html.
33
Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 31-32.
34

Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 33.
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military dictatorships, and other forms of
totalitarian governments all tangled in a
political web, especially following the events
of the 2011 Arab Spring revolts.
Demonstrating just how interconnected the
Arab world is, the UAE was accused by
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood elements of
granting refuge to criminals from Mubarak’s
regime, including former prime minister
Ahmad Shafiq after losing the 2012
presidential election. Shafiq faced charges of
corruption for his role in Mubarak’s regime35.
“With mass protests in Bahrain in spring
2011, and smaller protest movements in Saudi
Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait, the GCC (Gulf
Cooperation Council) states decided on a
common strategy toward the Arab Spring
abroad and the protests at home: protests in
other Arab states could be supported if this
served geopolitical interests, but there was
zero tolerance for protests or demands for
reform at home, where security and stability
remained priority number one”36. The various
Gulf States drew from different types of
support; Saudi Arabia opposed the Muslim
Brotherhood, which is banned in Saudi
Arabia, in favor of Wahabi elements more in
line with the Saudi’s interests; the UAE
remained opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood
and welcomed important officials from
Mubarak’s regime after its downfall; sensing
an opportunity to increase its influence at the
expense of other Gulf states, Qatar largely
backed the Muslim Brotherhood37
REIGION AND AUTOCRACY

The reason for sustained popular support
for Islamic movements in Egypt is primarily
derived from political and economic
35

Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf : Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t (Stanford,
CA: Stanford Briefs, 2013), 116.
36
Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, 118.
37
Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, 119.
38
Mark Tessler, “The Origins of Popular Support for
Islamist Movements: A Political Economy Analysis” in
Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, ed.

circumstances, rather than that of religious and
cultural traditions. In the words of a young
Algerian that supported the soon-to-be
overthrown FIS, “In this country, if you are a
young man… you only have four choices: you
can remain unemployed and celibate because
there are no jobs and no apartments to live in;
you can work in the black market and risk
being arrested; you can try to emigrate to
France to sweep the streets of Paris or
Marseilles; or you can join the FIS and vote
for Islam”38. Faced with a dauntingly stubborn
status quo that leaves the majority of
Egyptians in relative poverty while the elites
continue to thrive, Egyptians turn to Islamic
movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
‘Rais’, the Arabic translation of
‘president’, more directly translates to a
person in a leadership position as the head of a
group, leaving the term ‘president-for-life’ not
as alien to an Egyptian or a Tunisian as it may
be for an American39. Rachid al-Ghannouchi,
a Tunisian politician, argued that since North
African elite “speak a different political
language from the masses, there will
inevitably be an authoritarian dictator. In other
words, the processes of Westernization as
experienced in North Africa in the past
century lead not to democracy but to
authoritarianism. What is needed in order to
transcend that situation is a program that can
bridge the gap between the elite and the
masses- and this can be provided by Islam”40.
As demonstrated by the success of the
Muslim Brotherhood in the 2012 Egyptian
elections, Islamic populist opposition to
authoritarian regimes in the Arab world are
demonstrated to be willing to work within
flawed, existing political structures in order to
John Entelis (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1997), 93.
39
John Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents: The
Islamic Community and the State in North Africa,” in
Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, ed.
John Entelis (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1997), 12.
40
Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents,” 14.

10

POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI · #$#$

promote democratic processes41. Despite
western support for ‘risk-free democracies’
where, according to John L. Esposito,
“opposition parties and groups are tolerated as
long as they remain relatively weak or under
government control and do not threaten the
ruling group”42, Mohamed Morsi
demonstrated that truly free elections can
bring Islamic leaders opposed to Western
influences into power.
While political parties with doctrine based
in Islamic ideology have problems of their
own that are best addressed in a different
paper, they often provide the best, if not the
only legitimate opposition to Middle Eastern
autocracies, with the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt serving as no exception. Michael
Hudson, a political scientist focused with the
Middle East, wrote that democracy is not an
“ideal condition but… a process through
which the exercise of political power by
regime and state becomes less arbitrary,
exclusive, and authoritarian”43. Despite the
staggeringly broad array of values and politics
that various Islamic factions prescribe to,
Islamic parties in Egypt represent a chance at
achieving Hudson’s view of democracy.
While Morsi’s brief presidency was certainly
flawed and not without its own autocratic
tinges, it was not was not anymore
antidemocratic than other regimes in transition
from autocratic rule44. “Ideas of just rule,
religious or otherwise, are not fixed, even if
some radicals claim that they are. Such
notions are debated, argued, often fought
about, and re-formed in practice. The issue is
not whether such debates are occurring but
how to recognize their contours, as well as the
obstacles and the false starts, both internal and

external, to making governance less arbitrary
and authoritarian”45.

41

44

Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents,” 8.
Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents,” 9.
43
Dale Eickleman, “Muslim Politics: The Prospects for
Democracy in North Africa and the Middle East,” in
Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, ed.
John Entelis (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1997), 19.
42

CONCLUSION

The threads leading to the prevention of
democracy in Egypt are incredibly complex
and deeply entangled with one another.
Foreign support for oppressive Egyptian
regimes, frequently originating from the
United States or other Arab states, prop up
“stable” dictatorships while leaving
democratic activists to their own devices.
Ironically, Egypt’s key position as an
American ally in the War on Terror in the
regime has been used by Egyptian officials as
an opportunity to promote increasingly
draconian and authoritarian measures, with
government officials free to act without
interference from either their American or
Gulf allies or the Egyptian public.
However, as suggested by the Arab
Spring revolt in 2011 and other instances of
autocracies collapsing in similar countries in
the region, democracy remains a possibility
for the nation. Mubarak’s thirty one-year reign
was ended by mass protests in the streets, as
was Morsi’s presidency. The Egyptian people,
oppressed for decades, demonstrated once that
they were tired of inefficient, autocratic rule.
It remains to be seen if the same level of
protests can be seen under the increasingly
despotic rule of General el-Sisi.
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